British Inherited Conditional Citizenship (BICC)

What do you do with murderous first and second generation immigrants like Axel Rudakubana or Shamima Begum who not only refuse to integrate with the country who has given them everything, but choose to betray it, or even torture and kill its children? The answer is always nothing, because their citizenship is based on the right of the soil Jus Soli) or of the blood (Jus Sanguinis). Is this really an insoluble problem?

What Is A Citizen?

Broadly speaking, citizenship is based on three models: state recognition, acquisition, and theoretical ideas.

Under the doctrine of Jus Soli (Right of Soil), citizenship is automatically granted to anyone born within a country's territory. This model treats citizenship as an inherent right based on place of birth, regardless of parentage. Under the sibling doctrine of Jus Sanguinis (Right of Blood), it is granted based on descent—having a parent or sometimes grandparent who is a citizen. This model views citizenship as an inheritance tied to family and ancestral connection. Most European and Asian countries emphasize this approach.

Through naturalisation as an immigrant, citizenship is earned through fulfilling specific requirements after residing in a country for a designated period. These typically include language proficiency, knowledge of history/civics, good character, and sometimes financial stability or special skills. Some countries grant citizenship in exchange for significant investment. This model treats citizenship partly as a transactional relationship based on economic contribution.

In theoretical models, citizenship can be a contractual relationship between individual and state, with mutual rights and obligations (i.e. the citizen gains protection and rights in exchange for loyalty and following laws); as active participation in civic life and community (Republican civility: duties, public engagement, and contribution to common good);, or recognises cultural differences while providing a common political identity and equal rights (multicultural pluralism).

Revoking jus soli or jus sanguinis isn’t unheard of in spirit. The US flirted with denaturalisation in the 20th century for communists and Nazis, though it’s rare now. India’s Citizenship Amendment Act (2019) and Assam’s National Register of Citizens stirred similar debates—retroactively questioning who’s “in” based on ancestry or religion.

Asymmetrical British Overseas Citizenship

The United Kingdom has two types of citizenship. British Overseas Citizenship was created by the British Nationality Act 1981 as a residual category for people who had connections to former British colonies but didn't qualify for British citizenship or citizenship of the newly independent countries.

BOC emerged from the complex history of the British Empire's dissolution: as colonies gained independence, citizenship statuses needed to be redefined. BOC was essentially a transitional status which acknowledged historical British connections without granting full citizenship rights.

Most BOC holders today have connections to places like Malaysia, Kenya, India, and other former colonies where specific historical circumstances created this unique status.

It does not automatically provide the right to live or work in the UK
It does not confer the "right of abode" in the UK
Passport holders must obtain a visa to enter the UK
It cannot be passed to children (not transmissible by descent)
Holders are not considered EU/EEA citizens (when the UK was in the EU)

However, this relationship is asymmetrical. If you are a British citizen, you don't get to live in British territories like the French can. British citizens visiting the Turks & Caicos Islands, for example, require a visa or entry clearance for stays over 90 days, cannot work without a work permit, face restrictions on property ownership, and have no automatic right to settle permanently. To do so, one must have "belonger" status.

The concept of "Belonger" status in the TCI is a territorial citizenship category that grants the unrestricted right to live, work, and own property in the TCI, along with the right to vote in TCI elections, priority for certain jobs and business opportunities, and full access to public services and benefits. Belonger status is primarily obtained through birth in the TCI to at least one Belonger parent, descent from a Belonger, marriage to a Belonger after a qualifying period, or naturalization after extended residency.

TCI Belongers are typically also British Overseas Territories Citizens (BOTCs), and since 2002, most BOTCs are also full British citizens who can live and work in the UK without restrictions and have full rights of British citizens when in the UK. This arrangement exists to "protect" the local TCI economy and culture from being overwhelmed, allow the small territory to maintain control over immigration and population growth, preserve local political representation and property ownership, and balance the relationship between the UK and its overseas territory. The result is a situation where full British citizens don't automatically have the same rights in the territory as local Belongers do, despite the TCI being under British sovereignty.

This isn't unique.

Bermuda has "Bermudian Status," which controls who can live, work, vote, and own property without restrictions.
Cayman Islands has "Caymanian Status," limiting property ownership, employment, and voting rights to status holders.
British Virgin Islands has "Belonger Status," restricting land ownership and certain business activities to Belongers.
Anguilla maintains a system where only Anguillians have unrestricted residency and property rights.
Gibraltar has its own immigration controls despite being part of the EU Single Market when the UK was in the EU.
Montserrat restricts property ownership and certain rights to those with Montserratian status.
Falkland Islands has a "Falkland Islander Status" that provides preferential rights.
St. Helena, Ascension and Tristan da Cunha each maintain their own forms of local status.

Third Tier: Conditional Citizenship

If we already have two types of citizenship, why not a third? Britain already has mechanisms to revoke citizenship, but they’re narrow. Under the British Nationality Act 1981 (amended over the years), the Home Secretary can strip citizenship if it’s “conducive to the public good”—think terrorism or espionage—but only if the person won’t be left stateless. This has been used dozens of times since 2006.

However, it doesn’t apply to single-nationality Britons, because international law frowns on rendering someone a ghost with no country.

British Conditional Citizenship (BICC) would apply retrospectively to post-1945 naturalised immigrants and their descendants. Unlike full citizenship, It would come with strings attached: a probationary status where certain rights (e.g., permanent residency or protection from deportation) could be revoked if the holder crosses a legal or cultural red line. Conviction for serious crimes—terrorism, treason, or perhaps a bespoke “anti-integration” offence—could trigger a downgrade to BOC status or outright revocation.

British Citizen (BC):Who: Native-born (pre-1945 roots or fully assimilated lines), naturalised immigrants who’ve earned it, or their descendants beyond two generations.Rights: live, vote, work, never deported (unless dual-national and treasonous).Revocation: Near-impossible without dual citizenship (statelessness taboo).
British Overseas Citizen (BOC):Who: Empire leftovers—folks in ex-colonies (e.g., Malaysia, Kenya) who didn’t snag full citizenship post-1945 decolonisation. Rarely born in UK.Rights: A passport, consular help, but no right to abode. Revocation: Irrelevant—they’re already on the fringe.
British Inherited Conditional Citizenship (BICC):Who: Born in UK to post-1945 naturalised parents (or grandparents) from “substantially different” cultures—Pakistan, Somalia, Rwanda, etc. Applies until you “earn” BC or two gens pass.Rights: Live, work, vote—but revocable. Deportation looms if you fail economic/civic tests or commit scheduled crimes (terrorism, gang rape). A people’s petition can boot you too (more on this later)Revocation: Easy—conviction, disloyalty, or jury vote. No statelessness qualms; you’re out, wherever you land.

BICC would hinges on several factors — cultural origin, generational status, and earned worth. It would be revocable if you’re from a “substantially different” culture (post-1945 naturalisation), within two generations, and fail to “earn” full citizenship or commit a heinous act.

Clause 1: Would define BICC for post-1945 naturalised immigrants from designated cultures meeting an established burden of impassable "cultural distance" from Britannic custom (English, Scottish, Welsh, Irish);
Clause 2: Would set revocation triggers—scheduled crimes or economic failure (e.g., five years unemployed).
Clause 3: Would limits it to two generations (not applicable to great-grandkids).
Clause 4: Would restrict ambulance chasing: no appeals beyond a quick sanity check by a Crown Court judge.

Retrospectivity’s baked in. Everyone’s status gets reassessed—birth certificates cross-checked against the naturalisation register. The legal framework would be implemented in stages, starting with the most serious offenses (terrorism, treason) before expanding to other categories. Annual parliamentary assessment of outcomes would be required, including both security benefits and potential unintended consequences.

There is a flaw here which is recognisable: tracking generational lineage, monitoring integration metrics, and administering community service requirements would potentially create an enormous bureaucratic apparatus. It's addressable, but needs to be recognised.

Such a proposal would have three pillars:

1. Cultural Distance

Defining “substantially different” cultures is the linchpin. The Home Office would maintain a statutory list—Schedule A of the Act – of those countries possessing a "substantially different" culture from England. Islamic states (Pakistan, Somalia, seen as “hostile” to Britain’s Christian roots), high-violence non-Empire nations (Rwanda, Haiti), no exceptions. No “heritage” debates—Empire ties only count if pre-1945 naturalisation. It would be subject to annual review by Parliament, not bureaucrats. We have an FCO travel advice website, and embassies.

This is not intellectually difficult, but it would be highly susceptible to political manipulation and bias. Safeguards against these are essential.

The metrics here would need to be objective, and could start with:

Documented human rights violations in countries of origin
Terrorism sponsorship designations
Reciprocal citizenship rights with the UK
Educational system compatibility

Is Pakistan “different” enough but India not? Does Rwanda’s violence stat trump Jamaica’s? Lawyers (or clever immigrants) could argue their homeland’s “close enough” to Empire norms—shared cricket obsession, say, or a dusty colonial governor’s statue.

Cultures anchored in non-Christian faiths, especially those with historical or ideological friction with Britain’s Christian tradition.
Nations lacking Common Law or British-style governance (e.g. Rwanda’s civil law mishmash or Saudi Arabia’s theocratic code)
Countries with chronic instability or high violent crime. Stats from, say, UN crime reports could set a threshold (e.g., homicide rate 5x the UK’s).
No colonial tie pre-1945. Nigeria’s in; Vietnam’s out. Shared history—language, tea-drinking, queuing—counts as cultural glue.

A country’s would go on the list if it hits two+ criteria (e.g., Islamic and non-Empire). The FCO would run the numbers—religion stats, legal system audits, violence metrics.

The latest comprehensive data on UK immigration by country of origin comes from the 2021/22 Census (England and Wales) and ONS migration statistics for the year ending June 2024. The foreign-born population in the UK was approximately 10.7 million in 2021/22 (16% of the total population), rising to an estimated 11.4 million by June 2023 per ad hoc ONS estimates. By mid-2024, net migration reached 728,000, with non-EU countries dominating inflows.

India - Approximately 920,000 (2021/22 Census), with continued high inflows via work and study visas (e.g., health sector).
Poland - Approximately 700,000, though EU net migration has declined post-Brexit.
Pakistan - Approximately 630,000, with steady family and work-driven migration.
Romania - Approximately 540,000, reflecting post-2007 EU expansion mobility, though slowing.
Ireland - Approximately 500,000, stable due to historical ties and Common Travel Area.
Nigeria - Estimated 300,000–350,000 by 2024, rising sharply via work and study routes.
Italy - Approximately 300,000, with gradual EU decline offset by pre-Brexit settlers.
Bangladesh - Approximately 280,000, consistent family-based inflows.
Philippines - Approximately 250,000, growing via health and care worker visas.
Germany - Approximately 240,000, stable EU legacy population.

This list reflects foreign-born residents as of 2021/22, adjusted for 2024 trends (e.g., Nigeria’s surge, EU declines). Exact 2025 figures are unavailable, but patterns suggest non-EU growth (India, Nigeria, Pakistan) outpacing EU origins.

Drawing on demographic data (e.g., Pew Research for religion), legal system classifications (e.g., CIA World Factbook), violence metrics (e.g., UNODC homicide rates), and historical records of British colonial influence, the resulting list prioritises countries with stark contrasts to UK cultural norms, even if they aren’t major immigrant sources. An example Schedule A:

Saudi Arabia: Islamic theocracy, Sharia-based law, no Empire ties, moderate violence (repression-driven).
Iran: Islamic republic, non-Common Law, no Empire history, high instability.
Afghanistan: Islamic, tribal legal systems, no colonial link, extreme violence (war-torn).
Somalia: Islamic, customary/Islamic law, minimal Empire contact, severe instability.
Yemen: Islamic, non-Common Law, no Empire ties, high violence (civil war).
Sudan: Islamic majority, mixed legal system (non-Common), post-1956 independence, chronic conflict.
Pakistan: Islamic, partial Common Law but Sharia-influenced, post-1947 split, elevated violence.
Iraq: Islamic, civil law with Islamic elements, brief mandate only, persistent instability.
Syria: Islamic majority, civil law, no deep Empire ties, high violence (war).
Libya: Islamic, civil/Islamic law, post-1945 independence, significant unrest.
Algeria: Islamic, civil law (French influence), no British ties, historical violence.
Morocco: Islamic, civil law, no Empire connection, moderate stability.
Egypt: Islamic, mixed civil/Islamic law, brief protectorate status, periodic unrest.
Bangladesh: Islamic, partial Common Law but post-1971 divergence, no direct Empire rule, moderate violence.
Indonesia: Islamic majority, civil law (Dutch influence), no British ties, occasional instability.
Mali: Islamic majority, civil law (French), no Empire link, high violence (insurgency).
Niger: Islamic majority, civil law, no colonial tie, instability (terrorism).
Chad: Islamic/Christian split, civil law, no Empire history, chronic conflict.
Rwanda: Christian but post-genocide violence, civil law, no direct Empire tie, high historical instability.
Democratic Republic of the Congo: Christian, civil law, no British colonial rule, extreme violence.
North Korea: Atheist/Confucian, authoritarian system, no Empire link, repressive stability.
China: Atheist/Confucian, socialist legal system, minimal Empire contact (Hong Kong aside), controlled stability.
Vietnam: Buddhist/Confucian, socialist civil law, no British ties, historical conflict.
Thailand: Buddhist, civil law, never colonised by Britain, moderate stability.
Nepal: Hindu/Buddhist, mixed legal system, no direct Empire rule, low violence but culturally distinct.

Fifteen countries (1–15, plus Mali, Niger) are Islamic-majority, reflecting the prioritised religious divergence from the UK’s Christian heritage. Pakistan and Bangladesh, despite Commonwealth status, diverge post-1947/1971 with Islamic influence outweighing Empire echoes. Most lack British legal traditions, relying on civil, Islamic, or customary systems, amplifying distance (e.g., Saudi Arabia’s Sharia vs. UK’s Common Law).

High-conflict zones (Afghanistan, Somalia, Yemen) score heavily, as do historically violent states (Rwanda, DRC), contrasting with UK stability.

Nations like Morocco, Thailand, and Nepal never fell under British sway, unlike India or Nigeria, which retain cultural bridges (language, law). India (1.457 billion) and Nigeria (235 million) miss the cut—Empire ties and Christian/Common Law elements dilute their distance, despite size or violence in Nigeria’s case.

Only five Schedule A countries (20%) appear in the UK immigrant top 25:

Pakistan (3rd, 630,000)
Bangladesh (8th, 280,000)
Nigeria (6th, 300,000–350,000)
China (12th, 220,000),
Sri Lanka (20th, 120,000—if substituted for Zimbabwe).

Major UK immigrant sources like India (1st, 920,000), Poland (2nd, 700,000), Romania (4th, 540,000), and Ireland (5th, 500,000) don’t qualify for Schedule A due to Empire ties (India), Christian/EU alignment (Poland, Romania), or deep historical bonds (Ireland).

Saudi Arabia, Iran, Afghanistan, Somalia, and others send negligible numbers to the UK—often below 50,000 each—due to distance, policy barriers, or instability limiting migration flows.

The following are known or reasonably inferred to exhibit high levels of criminality among their UK immigrant groups, based on prison overrepresentation, specific crime patterns, or European proxies:

Pakistan: Clear overrepresentation in prison and specific offences (e.g., grooming gangs).
Somalia: Overrepresented relative to population; gang and violent crime links.
Vietnam: High prison share (1.3% vs. small population); tied to drug crimes.
Algeria: Overrepresented in prison (0.7% vs. 0.05% population share); petty crime noted.
Morocco: Moderate overrepresentation; North African crime trends apply.
Democratic Republic of the Congo: Some gang activity; overrepresentation relative to size.
Afghanistan: Inferred from European data (e.g., Germany); UK specifics unclear but plausible.

2. Earned Integration

If citizenship’s a privilege, not a birthright, how do you earn it? The Swiss know.

Minimum five years of uninterrupted tax-paying employment. No unreasonable gaps, no benefits. You’re a net giver, not a taker. Proof’s in the HMRC records.
Mandatory community service—say, 200 hours over a decade. Could be litter-picking, volunteering at a veterans’ home, or coaching kids’ rugby.
A beefed-up version of the Life in the UK test annually—history, laws, and a loyalty oath to King and country. Fail twice, and you’re on probation. Plus, no public disavowal of British customs (e.g., no preaching jihad).
No convictions above a minor summary magistrates conviction. One strike, and you’re out of the running.

Meet it by, say, age 35, and as a grace, you potentially “graduate” to full citizenship. Fail, and you stay conditional—vulnerable to revocation. There is an argument conditional status could expire after a sunset period (e.g., 10-15 years) of law-abiding residence, providing a clear path to full citizenship.

Cash-in-hand jobs dodge taxes; “volunteering” could be a friend's signature; test answers memorised, not meant. Set up a sham job (kebab shop “employee” paid under the table), bribe a community service log-keeper - all of these potentially fraudulent schemes would necessitate inspections. The Swiss manage it.

3. Generational Cut-off (Assimilation Window)

Studies suggest two generations—about 50 years—is when immigrant families typically “blend in.” The first generation clings to old ways; the second generation straddles both; the third generation’s usually native through-and-through.

Beyond two generations (great-grandkids), tracing naturalisation gets difficult. Punishing a fourth-generation kid for their great-great-nan’s boat ride feels unreasonable and petty: two generations ties the sin to a living memory—your parents’ choice to come here still echoes in you. Two generations is the "nasty spot" for disaffection where most violence and criminality appears to occur.

BICC would be limited to a maximum lineage of two generations. If your grandparents were naturalised, you’re still in BICC status. After that, you’re too woven into the tapestry to unpick.

What if granddad naturalised in 1946 but lied about his arrival? Or mum’s a citizen but dad’s a foreign ghost? Records pre-1970s are spotty—people could fudge their lineage. Anyone could forge a birth cert claiming a third-generation link or hide a naturalised parent’s status.

Revocation Process

The problem being solved here is simple: very serious criminality or failure to integrate by an individual. In England, we do not accept kin punishment. But if your children attack soldiers, join foreign Jihad paramilitary sects, or murder other children, they cannot stay. The crimes of a child or grandchild do not apply to the parents or grandparents. All are potentially removable, but only the child or grandchild convicted of the crime would be eligible for action based on their individual behaviour.

The BICC designation, and thus its revocation provisions, would apply exclusively to individuals born in the United Kingdom whose parents or grandparents were naturalised as British citizens after 1945, originating from jurisdictions classified as “substantially distant or different” in cultural essence—namely, those identified by statute as predominantly Islamic, exhibiting elevated violence metrics, or lacking historical ties to the British Empire, such as Pakistan, Somalia, or Rwanda.

This retrospective status would attach at birth and persist unless full citizenship is earned or two generations elapse, with revocation liability commencing at age 18 for criminal or disloyalty-based triggers, or age 35 for failure to satisfy economic and civic benchmarks.

For example, an individual born in 2004 to Rwandan parents naturalised in 2005, convicted of a terrorist offence in 2025, would face revocation and deportation; similarly, an individual born in 2000 to Pakistani immigrants naturalised in 1998, convicted of organised crime with a subsequent 80% petition, would be expelled, as would a person born in 2000 to Somali grandparents naturalised in 1970 who fails to meet citizenship-earning criteria by 2025.

In contrast, individuals holding full British Citizenship—derived from pre-1945 ancestry, earned status, or third-generation descent—would be exempt from this process, as are British Overseas Citizens, whose peripheral status renders them inapplicable. The BICC framework would target a distinct cohort of second-generation descendants from specified origins deemed malevolent or insufficiently integrated.

Serious Crimes:
- Terrorism (attacks, funding, recruitment), treason (aiding enemies of the Crown), organised violent crime (grooming gangs, drug cartels), murder with aggravating factors (e.g., mass casualties). Minimum sentence threshold 12 months to filter out petty theft or pub brawls.

Proof: Conviction in a Crown Court, beyond reasonable doubt. No “suspicions”—hard evidence only.

Disloyalty:
- Joining or materially supporting hostile foreign groups (ISIS, Al-Qaeda), public calls to overthrow the Crown or law, espionage for a non-allied state (e.g., Iran, not Canada).

Proof: Court-verified acts—travel records, intercepted comms, bank transfers.

Failure to Earn Full Citizenship:
- By age 35, no five years of tax-paying work, no 200 hours of civic service, no passing the loyalty test (history, oath, psych eval). Or, post-35, falling below the bar (e.g., five years on benefits).

Proof: Home Office audit—tax records, service logs, test fails. Black-and-white metrics.

Jury Nomination:
- Post-conviction (any crime, even light sentences), 80 of 100 locals vote you out by court petition.

Proof: Jury vote, judge-checked for bias. Conviction’s the gateway—then the mob decides.

Ensuring English Due Process

Courts can be very useful in delivering helpful delays which make an individual's situation far more favourable to them. That said, England requires fairness and the opportunity to face one's accusers to make a defence.

Order Trial

A jury trial process would start with the Home Office, County Court, or local court requesting a Revocation Order, or a formal notice detailing the basis for revocation—whether a qualifying criminal conviction, acts of disloyalty, or failure to meet citizenship-earning criteria—supported by specific evidence, such as judicial records or administrative findings.
Revocation for criminality or disloyalty would require proof beyond reasonable doubt (a previous jury conviction as matter of legal fact), whereas economic or civic shortcomings would be assessed on the balance of probabilities.
Upon a jury of peers confirming/qualifying the request and its subsequent issuance by a judge, the individual would be detained within 72 hours and scheduled for deportation, irrespective of destination state consent, with offshore detention facilities used if repatriation is delayed.

Appeal

Upon a jury qualifying an order of revocation, an affected individual would be eligible to lodge an appeal within 30 days, restricted solely to contesting technical errors of process—such as incorrect identification, evidence of jury misconduct, or falsified administrative records—rather than substantive grounds like innocence or mitigating circumstances.
This appeal would be adjudicated by a single Crown Court judge, who must deliver a binding decision within 14 days, either affirming the revocation or reinstating BICC status; no further recourse to higher courts, such as the Court of Appeal or Supreme Court, would be permitted.
The review would be confined to documentary evidence, excluding oral testimony or character submissions, and the revocation remains in effect throughout the appeal period, with the individual detained pending resolution.

Post-Conviction Expulsion

What if the state fails? Let's take the following scenario which is all-too-familiar to the English. Twelve peers convict you of, say, a grooming gang rape or a machete rampage. But the sentence is light—two years – thanks to a limp-wristed judge or overcrowded jails.

The rapist or murderer is out on the streets against the community's wishes. Or maybe they simply weren't convicted in the first place. They want you gone.

After conviction, vetted locals (five years’ residency, no criminal record) who’ve felt the fallout in the brutalised town (think Rochdale or Luton) must be able to nominate offenders for expulsion via registered petition at County Court.
The petition would require evidence-based screening before further action and judicial review focused on procedural fairness.
A formal role for security services would be established in identifying cases for review based on intelligence assessments.
A jury supermajority of 80% (80 of perhaps 100) could vote “out.” setting a barr to dodge the indulgence of vexatious or petty community vendettas. A judge would review the result for bias as a final stamp.
If the supermajority threshold is met, BICC status would revoked by local court order for registry at the Home Office. No appeal, no sob stories. No political involvement from the offices of state.

The jury would be a randomised selection—computer-picked from a 10-mile radius to provide anonymised votes. “Victimised” would mean direct victims or first-degree kin, verified by police reports. If collusion or jury-stacking were to be detected (e.g. ethnic tribalism), the conspirators lose their BICC.

Roadblocks From Foreign Institutions

Applying new standards to previously granted citizenship contradicts foundational legal principles against ex post facto laws. Citizenship is traditionally understood as an irrevocable status once properly granted. Creating different citizenship categories based on national origin or ancestry would arguably violate equal protection principles that form the cornerstone of internationalist legal systems.

Good.

In England, Parliament is sovereign above all else, anywhere, everywhere. It is above the court, and above the monarch. When Parliament issues a law, it cannot be challenged. If it issues the king his death warrant, he technically has to sign it. Supposedly, generally, kind of, as the basic idea.

The land of Magna Carta does not need foreign positive "state permissions."

This principle is ancient and simple for a thousand years, earned in blood and sweat: "other law" is not recognised in England. We govern ourselves by our own laws and will not accept any other situation. End of story.

ECHR Articles 7 & 8

Article 7 prohibits retroactive criminal law. It means you cannot be convicted of a crime for something you did which wasn't illegal at the time, and you cannot receive a harsher punishment than was available at the time of the offence. Fair enough.

1. No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international law at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the criminal offence was committed.

2. This Article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations.

The principle is absolute, but there is an exception for acts that were considered criminal according to the "general principles of law recognized by civilized nations" at the time of the act. A key case is Saakashvili v. Georgia (2020).

Article 8 is the hated clause which has been relentlessly abused by human rights lawyers for years to keep terrorists and murderers on British soil against the democratic will.

1. Everyone [including murderers, rapists, terrorists, and traitors, apparently] has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.

2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

Solution: international law is not sovereign over our Parliament. Repeal the Human Rights Act which codifies the ECHR into UK law. Enough of this abuse.

1954 & 1961 UN Conventions

The 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons and the 1961 UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness are international treaties designed to prevent and reduce statelessness globally. It establishes rules for the granting of nationality at birth and prohibits states from depriving individuals of their nationality if doing so would render them stateless. The Convention also creates safeguards for state succession scenarios and establishes procedures for determining statelessness status.

The United Kingdom ratified this Convention in 1966, which has meant it cannot deport individuals who have no country willing to accept them. The burden falls on UK authorities to definitively establish that another country will accept a deportee, which can be difficult to prove in practice.

The Convention also imposes limitations on detention, as the UK cannot indefinitely detain individuals pending deportation if they're effectively non-removable due to statelessness. This creates situations where individuals may remain in the UK despite being subject to deportation orders.

Solution: international law is not sovereign over our Parliament. Provide formal 12-month notification to the UN Secretary-General of the intention to withdraw from both.

Testing The Framework

But would it work in practice? Let's consider 10 different cases.

Scenario 1: Axel Rudakubana

Axel Rudakubana, born 2006 in Cardiff to Rwandan parents naturalised post-2005, stabbed three girls to death and injured others in Southport in July 2024, pleading guilty to murder, attempted murder, ricin production, and terrorism-related charges in January 2025. Under BICC, Rwanda is on Schedule A (Christian but violent, non-Empire, civil law), and his parents’ post-1945 naturalisation places him within two generations. His BICC status applies from birth. The trigger is clear: multiple murder convictions (serious crimes) and possession of an Al-Qaeda manual (disloyalty). The Home Office issues a Revocation Order citing court records. No tribunal is needed—convictions suffice. Rudakubana has 30 days to appeal procedural errors (e.g., identity mix-up), but with evidence airtight, a Crown Court judge upholds revocation in 14 days. Within 72 hours of confirmation, he’s detained and deported to Rwanda, despite their potential refusal, with offshore detention as a fallback.